

LONGITUDINAL BEHAVIOR DYNAMICS AMONG EXTREMIST USERS IN TWITTER

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INTRODUCTION

- Dark side of online interactions: misinformation, trolling, cyberbullying
- **Extremist groups** (Al-Qaeda, white supremacists, and **ISIS** or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) have embraced social media as a tool to:
 - Recruit new members
 - Undermine their rivals
 - Spread propaganda
- ISIS has been described by the FBI as the most adept terrorist group at using Internet and social media propaganda to recruit new members.

RELATED WORK

- Alfifi et al.
 - Retweets of ISIS are more than 3 times likely to be from suspended accounts
 - So, ISIS re-tweeters are also involved in malicious activities (and are most likely ISIS supporters)
- Badawi et al.
 - Explored how ISIS makes use of social media to spread its propaganda and to recruit militants
 - Provide evidence of important offline events that are strongly intertwined with the online conversation
 - Certain topics dominating the conversation right before or after ISIS's activity spikes
- Berger and Morgan
 - Studied how suspensions were limiting the social network of English-speaking ISIS supporters
 - Individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after being suspended suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts.

MOTIVATION

- Research gap in large scale analysis of ISIS reach and impact.
- Can we identify strategy/behavioral pattern that ISIS uses in Twitter?
- How does ISIS use different interaction strategies on Twitter to create a thriving online extremist community?


DATASET BREAKDOWN

- Original dataset collected by Texas A&M contains 17B+ Arabic tweets
- A sample of the original dataset
 - 2,438,794 tweets from 2014 to 2015
 - ISIS and ISIS-related

Type of Tweet	Percentage
Tweets from ISIS	60.8%
Mentions of ISIS accounts	20.5%
Retweets of ISIS tweets	15.3%
Quotes of ISIS tweets	2.8%
Quotes of Mentions of ISIS	0.6%

USER SUSPENSIONS

- Initially 93,159 users
- 25,000+ ISIS sympathizers (ISIS seed accounts)
 - Identified by crowdsourcing initiated by the Anonymous hacking group
 - Expanded by researchers
- Mostly got suspended by Twitter over time
- The number of users suspensions begins to drastically increase around March–July 2015



USER BEHAVIOR MODEL

- We model each user as a strategic agent who will choose to:
 - Tweet
 - Retweet
 - Quote or Mention
- 105 epochs (105 weeks during 2014–2015: $2 \times 365 / 7$)
- Each user has 315 (= 3 x 105) features
- This can be modeled by a two-dimensional unit simplex embedded in R^3 (Δ^3)

$$\mathbf{n}^i(e) = (n_T^i(e), n_R^i(e), n_Q^i(e))$$

$$\Delta^3 = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^3 : \|\mathbf{x}\|_1 = 1, \mathbf{x}_i \geq 0\}$$


$$\|\mathbf{x}\|_1 = \sum_i |x_i|$$

$$\mathbf{x}^i(e) = \frac{\mathbf{n}^i(e)}{\|\mathbf{n}^i(e)\|_1}$$

$$\mathbf{g}(e) = \sum_i^N \mathbf{n}^i(e)$$

USER BEHAVIOR MODEL (CONT'D)

- The dataset is dominated by tweet activity.



$$\mathbf{n}^i(e) = (n_T^i(e), n_R^i(e), n_Q^i(e))$$

$$\Delta^3 = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^3 : \|\mathbf{x}\|_1 = 1, \mathbf{x}_i \geq 0\}$$


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$$\mathbf{g}(e) = \sum_i^N \mathbf{n}^i(e)$$

USER BEHAVIOR MODEL (CONT'D)

- Strategy changes substantially in the middle of 2015 as a result of account suspensions.
- An increase in number of RTs and QT/MT:
 - Switch in the strategic behavior of key accounts



$$\mathbf{n}^i(e) = (n_T^i(e), n_R^i(e), n_Q^i(e))$$

$$\Delta^3 = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^3 : \|\mathbf{x}\|_1 = 1, \mathbf{x}_i \geq 0\}$$

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
$$\mathbf{x}^i(e) = \frac{\mathbf{n}^i(e)}{\|\mathbf{n}^i(e)\|_1}$$

$$\mathbf{g}(e) = \sum_i^N \mathbf{n}^i(e)$$

$$\mathbf{x}^g = \frac{\mathbf{g}(e)}{\|\mathbf{g}(e)\|_1}$$

BEHAVIOR CLUSTERING

- K-means (unsupervised) clustering
 - Best Silhouette and Davies-Bouldin scores with $k=4$
- GMM (Gaussian Mixture Models)
 - Best Silhouette and Davies-Bouldin scores with $k=4$
- K-means yielded better scores, but clusters were to some extent consistent among the two methods.
- PCA to project 3×10^5 -dimensional vectors into 3-dimensional vectors




ROLES AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS

- **Content Producers:** tend to produce original content (tweets)
- **Content Amplifiers:** Use *retweets*, *quotes*, or *mentions* as a tool to amplify the posted tweets
- **Bimodal Cluster:**
 - Begin by using a mixture of tweets, retweets and quotes,
 - Then, transition to almost exclusive use of tweets
 - And then, transition back

CLUSTERS OF ACCOUNTS


Cluster 0
Content producers

61% of 500 top
retweeted users




- Strategy Histogram
- Strategy Moving Average
- Strategy Points

Cluster 1
Content amplifiers




- Strategy Histogram
- Strategy Moving Average
- Strategy Points

Cluster 2
Bimodal



- Strategy Histogram
- Strategy Moving Average
- Strategy Points



Cluster 3
Content producers



- Strategy Histogram
- Strategy Moving Average
- Strategy Points


SHIFTED ACCOUNTS

- Number of accounts in the bimodal cluster who shifted from amplifying to tweeting and vice versa
- An increasing number of users shift from amplifying to tweeting until week 64 (2nd week of March)
- Smooth decrease in shifting from tweeting to amplifying (week 66; parts of the 1st and 2nd weeks of April)







RETWEET NETWORK OF TOP-50 TWEETERS

- Top 50 accounts who posted the highest number of tweets during 2014–2015
- Larger vertex = more posted tweets
- 643 vertices in total (including retweeters of top-50)
- Accounts in C_0 and C_3 (content producers) are heavily retweeted




CENTRALITY OF CLUSTERS

- A higher number of accounts in the amplifying cluster (C_1) have zero in-degree (are not retweeted)
- A higher number of accounts from content producing (C_0 and C_3) and the bimodal (C_2) clusters have non-zero in-degrees (are retweeted) and zero out-degrees
- Some accounts are used solely for retweeting content while other accounts are used for content production
- Supports our clustering




RETWEET NETWORK OF TOP-50 ACTIVE ACCOUNTS

- Top 50 accounts based on total Twitter activity
- 1,927 vertices in total (including retweeters)



OUTLIER ACCOUNT


- Top 20 users
- 50k+ followers
- Produced 15,000 tweets
- 64% of retweeters are non-ISIS
 - Significant impact in reaching out to accounts beyond the ISIS community



OUTLIER ACCOUNT (CONT'D)

- Top 20 users
- ISIS users who retweeted the outlier account at least 100 times


Top 20 users who retweeted Outlier account



OUTLIER ACCOUNT (CONT'D)

- Wilcoxon signed-rank test
 - Measure the statistical significance of difference between the behavior of the outlier and top-50 active users

Column	Result	<i>P</i> -Value	Stat.
Tweets	Diff.	4.4×10^{-9}	869
Quotes/Mentions	Diff.	2.2×10^{-8}	417
Retweets	No diff.	0.71	1622
Combined	Diff.	3.1×10^{-18}	45



Thanks for your attention!

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